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Abstract 
 
Most of crises, environmental, humanitarian, 
economic or even social, occur after different 
presaging signals that permit to trigger warnings. 
These warnings can help to prevent damages and 
harm if they are issued timely and provide 
information that helps responders and population to 
adequately prepare for the disaster to come. Today, 
there are many systems based on Information and 
Communication Technologies that are designed to 
recognize foreboding signals of crises to limit their 
consequences. Warning system are part of them, they 
have proved to be effective, but as for all systems 
including human beings, a part of unpredictable 
remains. In this article, we provide a method of data 
analysis that allows decision makers in crisis cells to 
have answer elements to the question of alerting or 
not populations in a given geographical area. This 
method is based on a selection of factors that 
influence population behaviors, for which we 
establish a list of relevant indicators that can be 
informed in the preliminary phase of a crisis into 
warning systems. From these indicators, we propose 
a tool for decision support (based on a decision tree 
as a possible representation). 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The insertion in computer systems of cognitive 
elements and simulation of realistic human behaviors 
to reproduce or predict events or actions is a 
challenge for developers. Understanding human 
behavior so that it can be integrated into 
computerized systems is still a challenge, requiring 
the interconnection of heterogeneous elements that 
can be physiological, psychological, social or 
environmental. Today, thanks to advances in data 
management, it is faster and more efficient to manage 
real time data, make maps from geolocalized data or 
make assessments based on scenarios that integrate 
data from different sources. These evolutions enabled 
to improve crisis management systems, developed to 
support those who respond to disasters. Indeed, a lot 
of important decisions have to be taken before and 
during crises. They are based on objective data and 
information but are also determined by subjective 
elements such as cognitive biases that can limit the 
effectiveness of the response. A manner to limit the 
effect of cognitive biases is to improve the 
completeness of information in crisis management 
systems. Crisis management systems help in 
particular to predict as precisely and as soon as 
possible the consequences of a crisis and its evolution 
in a given territory. They allow to take into account 
more and more complex information. Indeed, crisis 
management systems integrate data from different 
sources and natures to predict as finely as possible 
and in advance the emergence, the flow of a crisis 
and its consequences on a given territory.  Despite 
knowledge and technologies developed in order to 
minimize or avoid disastrous consequences that a 
crisis can produce, crises remain, partly, determined 
by uncertain phenomena, which are not always 
considered in these crisis management systems. The 
vulnerability of territories, the need for coordination 
among services, and the probable behaviors of 
populations-in-danger, for example, are sometimes 
neglected [1]. 
 
Before and after a crisis, people act according to 
their own knowledge and interpretation schemes. 
These schemes do not always allow people to react in 
an appropriate way to risky situations and can lead to 
dangerous reactions [2]. ICTs are a key element in 
these warning systems, they help to guide the 
behavior of individuals when a crisis is announced by 
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providing them knowledge before the crisis, and by 
guiding them in the interpretation of the signals 
perceived during the crisis. Several actors gravitate 
around these warning systems with different roles. 
The main actors are the crisis management specialists 
and experts who build models and help fueling the 
warning system, the decision-makers who act for the 
resolution of crisis, the actors of the field who apply 
the decisions taken in the crisis cell and finally the 
populations. This article will only focus on the last 
category of actors, the populations, by offering an 
analysis based on their behavior during a crisis. 
Taking into account the laws and phenomena 
governing behavior in crisis situation seems to us an 
important axis of research and reflection on the 
improvement of the alert/warning diffusion, the crisis 
communication and on the development of policies of 
education and targeted outreach. Indeed, many 
recommendations advocate referring warning 
systems to more human-centered aspects, mainly 
through the participation of populations in decision-
making processes [3]. It seems to us complementary 
to this approach to integrate these human-centered 
aspects in the knowledge of the risk and in the 
sensitization made through the knowledge of its 
behaviors. 
Thus, in order to improve the adaptation of 
warning systems to the populations concerned, we 
propose in this article a method to help decision-
makers (often in a crisis cell) to determine whether or 
not they should alert people according to their likely 
behaviors. Warning populations can help to cope 
with a crisis by protecting the populations, but it can 
also constitute a threat and have more harmful effects 
than those of the crisis. On November 13, 2015, 
during the attacks in Paris, the President of the 
Republic decided not to evacuate the Stade de France 
for example, to avoid crowd movements with new 
dangerous consequences. 
 
At first, we define here the main concepts related 
to our proposal, via a state of the art. We then 
propose our decision support process to determine 
whether populations need to be alerted to their likely 
behaviors. We then apply our approach to real cases 
in order to validate its feasibility. Finally we 
conclude and give some research perspectives. 
 
 
2. Related works 
 
     The reactions of the populations have a major 
impact on the resolution of a crisis. One of the 
challenges of early warning systems is to take into 
account the natural reactions of the people affected 
by the crisis to make them evolving upstream of the 
crisis, to anticipate them, and to correct them if 
necessary during and after the crisis. 
 
2.1. Early warning systems 
 
Natural disasters are a constant cause of human 
suffering and economic loss around the world. 
Climate change and rapid urbanization only 
aggravate the problem. For upstream contingency 
plans to be as effective as possible, it is vital to have 
an early warning system. Early-warning is the 
provision of timely and effective information that 
allows organizations and individuals to take action to 
avoid or reduce their risk and prepare for effective 
response [4].  It should be noted that an early warning 
system is specific to a type of environment but also to 
the environment for which it has been set up 
(geographical area, political decisions, etc.). 
Therefore, there are no two identical systems. 
 
A complete and effective EWS comprises four 
elements [3]: 
- Risk knowledge: knowledge of the relevant 
hazard and vulnerability; 
- Monitoring and warning service: technical 
capacities to constantly monitor hazard 
precursors, prediction of potential risks and 
warning issue; 
- Dissemination and communication: 
dissemination of understandable warnings with 
prior preparedness information; 
- Response capability: knowledge of risks, 
warning services plans and appropriate actions 
for persons at risk. 
In this sequential list, each element has two direct 
links and interactions with each of the other elements. 
Failure of any part of the system will imply failure of 
the whole system. Human factor in particular plays a 
significant and transversal role in all steps [5, 6]. 
 
We consider in this paper, according to [7], that 
an early warning system is a "Chain of information 
communication systems comprising sensor, 
detection, decision, and broker-subsystems, in the 
given order, working in conjunction, forecasting and 
signaling disturbances adversely acting the stability 
of the physical world; and giving sufficient time for 
the response system to prepare resources and 
response actions to minimize the impact on the 
stability of the physical world".  
 
Thus, an early warning system is a set of tools for 
predicting hazards [8, 9]. Understanding and 
responding adequately to early warning signals 
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before they manifest themselves and turn into acute 
needs is in many cases more effective than 
responding only after the disaster has occurred. 
Ideally, early warning signals should trigger 
appropriate actions to alert the population of the 
danger. Alerts and decisions to evacuate the 
population; deploy disaster relief teams in a 
city/region; or pre-position goods, are the interface 
between preparation and response. The sooner an 
alert is issued, the more time it takes to trigger these 
actions. However, the information on the danger is 
often not very precise in the preliminary phase of a 
crisis, it becomes more and more precise only as the 
time passes (likewise, the threat becomes more and 
more concrete). Before deciding on the actions to be 
taken, the decision-makers seek to obtain the most 
precise information possible on the event, what are 
the possible actions and the necessary resources. 
In addition to this information, we propose to 
integrate the characteristics of the population that can 
have an impact on their reactions to the alert and to 
the crisis itself. 
 
2.2. Population and Behaviors 
 
The behavior concept needs to be clarified and 
well defined, since it can be approached very 
differently in the scientific sphere. Some speak of 
"nomadic" concept that can take several meanings 
according to the disciplines [10]. In philosophy, for 
example, definitions rest on the notions of conscience 
and experiences [11], although in cognitive sciences 
it can be approached as a logical suite of actions [12]. 
The most important works on the subject are 
provided by human sciences, notably in ethology and 
in psychology domains [13, 14]. In this paper we take 
up the definition of [15] for whom the behavior 
corresponds to the "reactions of a person, considered 
in a milieu and in a given time unit to an excitation or 
a set of stimulation". Human behavior is also 
integrated in artificial intelligence research whose 
idea is to transport knowledge elements in a virtual 
reality and to provide reasoning for the treatment of 
these elements. Applications of artificial intelligence, 
for example, enable virtual agents to make strategic 
choices. We find these kinds of research in domains 
such as automatic production of explanations or 
solving mathematical problems [16], but it is still 
difficult today to integrate cognitive dimensions of 
behaviors to these computer science representations.  
 
Individual behaviors in crisis situations do not 
correspond to everyday life behaviors. It is difficult 
to represent these behaviors from the information that 
has been obtained after a crisis, as this information is 
always static, punctual and contextual. This causes 
difficulties to integrate the great diversity of human 
reactions that can appear in crisis situations. We can 
however work to establish tendencies, or correlations 
on factors that orient particular behaviors.  
This information nevertheless makes it possible to 
cite some types of behavior frequently observed in 
crisis situations [17]: evacuation, flight; panic escape; 
stupidity, stupefaction; immobility; confinement, 
sheltering; fight against the effects of the disaster; 
search for relatives; assistance, emergency relief; so-
called "antisocial" behavior; curiosity; return to the 
place of residence, of work. 
There are three types of behaviors: (i) reflex or 
instinctive behaviors that allow rapid action through 
struggle, stun or flight, (ii) panic behaviors, emerging 
crowd phenomena via imitation mechanisms or 
contagion and (iii) controlled behaviors that are 
reasoned reactions [18]. 
It is important to take into account a maximum of 
elements to study the behaviors in crisis situation; 
two events which seem similar can bring very 
different reactions. Between the tsunami that 
occurred in Fukushima on March 11, 2011 and the 
one that occurred five years later, on November 22, 
2016, the reactions of the authorities and the 
inhabitants evolved in a very significant way. In 
2016, the Prime Minister ordered the government to 
warn the public with accurate and reliable 
information on evacuation procedures and calls to 
evacuate were much more numerous. Reactions in 
general were greatly influenced by the lived 
experience five years ago. Emotions such as fear or 
surprise can also have a strong influence on crowd 
movements, as it was the case after the football 
match on June 3, 2017 in Turin following a bomb 
attack rumor. 
 
2.3. Decision support in crisis management 
 
In France, protection against accidents and 
disasters is a function of the State. This role is 
provided by the civil safety teams, which rests on 
different specialist services who act for civil safety, 
firefighters, military units of training and 
intervention, pilots of aircraft and helicopters as well 
as mine-clearing experts. Their roles are directed by 
the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Civile et de la 
Gestion des Crises (General Direction of the Civil 
Safety and of the Crisis Management) under the 
direction of the Ministry of the Interior. They define 
particularly the missions of evaluation, preparation, 
coordination and application of protection, the 
information and warning systems for populations, the 
prevention of civil risks of all types, and the planning 
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of civil security measures. This organization rests on 
the 101 prefectures present on the French territory. 
 
2.3.1. The decision in a crisis cell 
 
     The urgency of a crisis situation requires that 
decisions leading to its resolution be quick and 
effective [19]. In a crisis cell, decisions are 
conditioned by high uncertainties, a high number of 
stakeholders, extremely short or relatively long 
durations, communication problems, and important 
issues far beyond the immediate operational aspects 
[20]. Whether or not they are part of safeguarding 
plans, many decisions need to be made. These 
decisions are generally made collectively and focus 
on the choice of the actions to be carried out and the 
resources allocated to these actions. Decisions are 
made by a multiplicity of stakeholders, which can 
create difficulties in finding common ground for all 
stakeholders. Decisions do not always make 
consensus. Thus, tools to help making decisions are 
needed. 
 
2.3.2. Tools available to decision-makers 
 
     The simplest tools are often the most used in crisis 
management. They are used for different purposes 
during the prodromal phase of a crisis, for 
prospective analysis activities by analyzing the multi-
domain consequences following different 
assumptions, situation analysis and planning 
activities. 
 
     Decision-makers have at their disposal descriptive 
models (Tables, Geographical Information Systems, 
Ontologies …) and models of decision support. 
     There are many specific models dedicated to 
decision support for a type of crisis in a given 
territory, but few generic models have been proposed 
in the literature, but we should mention: Avoidance 
model [21], Generic model of Nioche [22], Sayech 
Model [23], and Meta-ontology of the ISyCri project 
[24]. On the other hand, there are decision support 
models that are not specific to crisis management, 
such as (multicriteria) decision support models, 
recommender systems or predictive models derived 
from Machine Learning. The latter two require large 
volumes of data to learn the model and verify its 
applicability. In crisis management, such a volume of 
data relating to many "similar" crises is currently 
non-existent. We have therefore turned to decision 
support models that have the ability to work with 
small datasets and, in addition, allow for some 
explanations of the proposed decisions. 
 
     Finally, to make information accessible to 
decision-makers who are not computer scientists but 
who make decisions with major issues, a possibility 
is to use decision trees [25] that have the specificity 
of representing a set of choices, in the graphic form 
of a tree. The different possible decisions are located 
at the ends of the branches (the "leaves" of the tree), 
and are reached according to decisions made at each 
stage. The decision tree is a tool used in various 
fields such as security, data mining, medicine, etc. It 
has the advantage of being easy to read and quick to 
execute [25].  
 
3. Our decision support process 
 
     Many factors can influence the decision to alert 
people about the threat of a future crisis. We can cite 
the level of risk, the warning devices or the material 
and human resources that can be deployed in the 
area, but also factors that are more difficult to 
anticipate, such as the behaviors of the populations: 
the way the populations respond to the alert can have 
a positive or negative impact on the consequences of 
the crisis. The decision to alert, itself, can have an 
influence on major issues, particularly the economic 
stake with the shutdown of the activity at the time of 
the alert, and the political stake: alert may have 
impacts on people's perception of their level of 
security or of the authorities' ability to protect them. 
 
     The decision to alert or not the populations is 
generally taken by a group of decision-makers 
present in the crisis cell; it is based on information 
elements which were collected on the nature of the 
crisis (potential or certain), on its potential impacts, 
and the human appreciation based on the experience 
of those present. It is therefore based on both 
objective and subjective elements, but it has been 
shown that the decisions made by the decision-
makers, whether in the pre-crisis phase (latency 
phase), during the response period or during the post-
crisis phase are subject to cognitive biases that may 
influence them in a way that is contrary to rationality 
and effectiveness of the response to the various issues 
of these three phases [26]. It is therefore important to 
offer decision-makers assistance in their analysis of 
the situation. We propose our process of decision 
support to alert or not the populations, according to 
the behaviors that may be observed in response to the 
alert. 
 
     We present our contribution through the creation 
of a process for the construction of a decision support 
tool. This approach aims to help decision-makers in 
the prodromal phase of a crisis to identify the 
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warning zones and the means to implement, as well 
as the information to be disseminated. It is based on 
explicit knowledge, relating to the behavior of 
populations in case of alert or crisis. We therefore 
propose an approach for the design of a structured 
decision support tool in four steps: (1) Data 
collection from heterogeneous sources, (2) indicators 
selection and aggregation, (3) analysis based on a 
decision-making model and (4) results interpretation 
(Figure 1).  
     The aim is to provide a systemic view of the 
behavior of populations in crisis, to provide an 
indication of the likely behavior of a population in 
response to an alert for a crisis announced in a given 
city.  
 
     The first step in the process is to build a 
knowledge base on past crises. This database will be 
a collection of data from heterogeneous sources 
obtained from research on social networks, field 
surveys based on questionnaires, vulnerability 
studies, weak signal sensors or individual and 
collective motion sensors, and search on the web. 
The data collected correspond, among others, to the 
behavioral factors as well as to the actual behavior of 
the populations during the crisis. 
 
     From the data collected in the first step, we 
determine a second step of indicator selection and 
aggregation to obtain a new set of indicators that are 
as independent as possible from each other. The 
selection is obtained from interviews with experts 
and decision-makers or from algorithms. 
 
     The third step is to use this new set of indicators 
to analyze data on population behavior factors to 
determine actual behaviors for a given crisis. We 
choose to use algorithms to generate decision rules to 
perform this analysis, as this type of model allows an 
easily understandable reading of the results for the 
decision-maker. One possible representation, among 
others, would be a decision tree. 
 
     Finally, the last step is for the decision-maker to 
interpret the results to make a decision, identify any 
inconsistencies or erroneous rules based on examples 
of situations. 
 
 
4. Applications to real cases  
 
     In this section, we apply our decision support 
process to real cases. 
 
Step 1: (Heterogeneous) data collection 
 
     The case studies were selected from the accidents 
listed in the ARIA database (analysis, research and 
information on accidents) which lists more than 
46000 accidents occurred mainly in France but also 
abroad. The accidents involved are the result of 
industrial activities, the transport of hazardous 
materials, the distribution and use of gas, pressure 
equipment, underground mines and storage facilities, 
and dikes and dams. This database is developed by 
the Ministry of Ecological and Solidarity Transition. 
It is available free of charge on the website 
www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr. The 9 case 
studies that we selected stem from events that 
occurred in France between 1981 and 2013 and had 
human and social consequences of 5 or 6 on the 
European scale of accidents, ranging from 0 to 6. 
This scale created in 1994 for the application of the 
SEVESO directive (on the control of major-accident 
hazards involving dangerous substances) is based on 
18 technical parameters intended to characterize the 
Figure 1: Our decision support process 
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effects or consequences of accidents. Each of these 
parameters has 6 levels. In France, the European 
scale is represented according to 4 indices including 
human and social consequences which take for 
example the total number of deaths, wounded with 
hospitalization superior to 24h, residents evacuated or 
confined to their homes, deprived of potable water… 
 
 
We have collected some data in the ARIA database. 
The rest of the data has been obtained from various 
databases made available on institutional sites and 
from newspaper archives: 
• www.georisques.gouv.fr for the existence of 
risk prevention plans; 
• carto.observatoire-des-territoires.gouv.fr for 
demographic indicators ; 
• www.insee.fr for nationality data; 
• www.meteofrance.com for meteorological 
data; 
• Local and national newspapers: 
www.nouvelobs.com, www.ladepeche.fr, 
www.lemonde.fr... 
  
 
Step 2: Indicator selection and aggregation 
     
     In [27] we proposed different factors and 
indicators that allow us to integrate knowledge about 
the behavior of populations into warning systems.  
     These 20 factors and 74 indicators are intended, 
through their analysis, to shed light on decisions that 
may affect populations.  
 
 
These different factors are presented separately from 
one to another, in Table 1, but it is important to note 
the strong dependency between some indicators that 
compose them and between the factors themselves. 
 
     In the remainder of this study, we limit ourselves 
to the indicators that were readily available in the 
data sources at our disposal, namely, age, sex, 
population density, and time of day. Due to the low 
number of accessible indicators, we do not aggregate 
them. 
 
Step 3: Analysis and Decision model 
 
With the aim of providing a systemic view of the 
behavior of populations in crisis situations (which 
can be useful for improving risk knowledge, the 
selection of relevant indicators to be monitored 
during the prodromal phase of a crisis, the issuance 
of alerts and awareness of populations), we propose a 
(static) process, based on decision tree. Indeed, as 
indicated in section 2.3.2, a decision tree has the 
advantage of being easy to read and quick to execute. 
 
There are many algorithms for generating 
decision trees. The two most known and used [28] 
are C4.5 and Random Tree. C4.5 builds decision 
trees from a set of training data using the concept of 
information entropy [29]. Random Tree is a 
supervised classifier; it is an ensemble learning 
algorithm that generates many individual learners. It 
employs a bagging idea to produce a random set of 
data for constructing a decision tree. In standard tree 
each node is split using the best split among all 
variables [30]. 
Table 1: Population behavior factors and indicators 
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We therefore used these two algorithms, 
implemented in the Weka1 software, to analyze our 
data (C4.5 is implemented as J48). Finally, it should 
be noted that these algorithms need possible 
decisions (classes) as input data and then seek to 
determine a classification of elements according to 
the initial classes. From the data sources at our 
disposal, the possible decisions/classes we have 
identified are: panic, rumors, panic_and_rumors, 
nothingness (no reaction of panic or rumor). 
 
Table 2 and Figures 2 and 3 show the obtained results 
with the 9 instances and 14 attributes we have. 
     Our 9 instances correspond to accidents/crises that 
took place in French cities: Lyon (2008), Rouen 
(2013), Nemours (2005), Villeurbanne (1981), 
Béziers (2005), Dagneux (2007), Saint-Galmier 
(2000), Saint-Just-Saint-Rambert (2005), Montoir-de-
Bretagne (2002).  
     The 14 attributes used in our study are:  
• Visual signals, 
• Sound signals, 
• Olfactory signals, 
• Population density, 
• Type of urbanism, 
• Moment of the day, 
• Number of foreigners, 
• Panic or rumors, 
• Part of under 15s (%), 
• 75 years and over (%), 
• Weather, 
• Male/female ratio, 
• Number of accidents in the city, 
 
 
                                                 
1 www.weka.fr 
 
 
 
• The city is located within the perimeter of a 
PPRT (technological risk prevention plan) 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary table of the classification (J48-
C4.5 and Random Tree) 
 J48 – C4.5 Random Tree 
#Instances 9 9 
#Attributes 14 14 
Correctly Classified 
Instances 
8 (88.89 %) 9 (100 %) 
Incorrectly Classified 
Instances 
1 (11.11 %) 0   (0 %) 
Kappa statistic2 0.83 1 
MAE3 0.08 0.03 
RMSE4 0.21 0.08 
RAE5 25.06 % 9.74 % 
RRSE6 50.51 % 20.12 % 
Size of the tree 5 12 
 
                                                 
2 Cohen's kappa coefficient is a statistic which 
measures inter-rater agreement for qualitative 
(categorical) items, its value is in [0, 1]. The higher 
the value, the better the results. 
3 Mean Absolute Error: The smaller the value, the 
better the results. 
4 Root Mean Squared Error: The smaller the value, 
the better the results. 
5 Relative Absolute Error: The smaller the value, the 
better the results 
6 Root Relative Squared Error: The smaller the value, 
the better the results 
Figure 2: Decision tree obtained with the algorithm J48-C4.5 
Pruned Tree 
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Step 4: Results interpretation 
 
The results, presented in the form of decision 
tables, have the objective to aid decision-makers to 
evaluate the relevance of alerting the populations by 
identifying the risks of rumors and panic. They give 
indications to target the populations thanks to the 
designation of categories that are more sensible to 
rumors and panic behaviors. 
 
According to Table 2, we observe that the 
Random Tree algorithm, based on a random set of 
indicators selected to represent the decision nodes, 
offers better performances than the C4.5 algorithm, 
which uses an entropy function to select the decision 
nodes. Indeed, with Random Tree, the instances are 
better ranked (100% against 88.89% for C4.5), the 
Kappa test has a value of 1 (which is the maximum 
achievable value), the values of MAE and RMSE are 
the smallest (> 0.08) and RAE and RRSE are 
significantly better than C4.5. 
 
The set of rules that emerge from the construction 
of the decision trees of these two algorithms have the 
advantage of being easily interpretable by those 
interested.  
 
According to Figure 2 (C4.5), the decision nodes 
are identified and make it possible to discriminate 
between the different categories of the class attribute 
(here called ratio-man-woman). We can thus classify 
from this tree (Figure 2) a crisis situation in a city for 
which the part of the under 15s is greater than 15.3 
and the ratio male/female greater than 1.11 as a 
situation where the risk “panic and rumors” is high. 
 
According to Figure 3 (Random Tree), we observe 
that more information is accessible (more 
intermediate classes exist, unlike Figure 2). Thus, the 
decision-maker has more leeway in his decision. It 
should be noted that we find close decisions in the 
two trees, for example, when the part of the under 
15s is higher than a certain threshold (rather low), 
then the risk "Nothingness" is more likely. 
 
Finally, these preliminary results are to be taken 
with a pinch of salt. Indeed, the data at our disposal 
are not sufficient for the algorithms to provide 
realistic decision trees. The purpose of this article and 
the experiments carried out is to show the feasibility 
of our approach. It would take hundreds of instances 
and more indicators to begin to have 
consistent/realistic results. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
     Early warning systems are very strongly linked to 
the actions of the individuals who constitute them. 
The reactions of the populations in particular can 
have a great importance in the effectiveness of the 
alert and the effects can be felt in the long term. This 
is why we propose in this article a decision support 
process to alert or not the populations in a crisis 
situation. 
In order to validate the feasibility of our approach, 
we applied it to real data by proposing a decision tree 
for the decision-makers in a crisis cell and thus help 
them to determine whether to alert the population or 
not. 
Figure 3: Decision tree obtained with the algorithm Random Tree 
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     As future work, our approach will have to be 
validated by a cross analysis between risk experts on 
different domains. It will be necessary to identify the 
precise characteristics of the alert and the response 
according to the typology of the crises so that the 
different factors/indicators and decisions can be 
appropriately selected. Care must be taken to work on 
the recovery of data from different sources in a tool 
that can be integrated into a crisis cell. 
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